0DTE Options: Lottery or Opportunity?

Few financial instruments have divided practitioners and scholarsas sharply as zero-days-to expiration-options, or 0DTEs. Criticssee them as a source of chaos: in 2023, J.P. Morgan's Marko Kolanovic warned that their growth could trigger sharp market swings. Supporters see a cheap and precise tool for managing risk. Is the bad reputation deserved? Drawing on market data and recent research, this article looks at what 0DTEs really are, who trades them, and why some professionals love them while othersare seriously worried.

A 0DTE is not a special kind of contract. It is any option traded on its last day of life. A weekly S&P 500 (SPX) option listed a week ago becomes a 0DTE on the morning it expires, and so does a monthly option listed a year ago. What turned 0DTEs into a market of their own is that today an SPX option expires everysingle trading day.

This happened gradually: Cboe, the Chicago Board OptionsExchange, introduced weekly SPX options expiring on Fridays in 2005. In 2016 it added Monday and Wednesday expirations, and in 2022 Tuesday and Thursday, completing the week.

Trading activity grew rapidly. In July 2026, 0DTEs reached a record 66.2% of all S&P 500 options volume, up from about 5% in 2016. Across the whole US options market they averaged 24.2 million contracts a day in the third quarter of 2026, about 36% of total volume. Institutions account for the vast majority of this activity, around 94%, yet for retail traders 0DTEs have become the main way to trade S&P 500 options.

 

 

 

To understand why such a sharp concentration of trading volume occurred, we have to utilise market microstructure principles demonstrated by Prof. Marco Pagano in 1989. He observed that “liquidity begets liquidity” i.e. there are increasing liquidity externalities in exchange markets and traders tend to aggregate there, because the highest existing volume guarantees a higher likelihood of execution and tighter spreads (in a sense we could say that this self-feeding loop demonstrates reflexive properties as George Soros might say).

In greater detail, Pederzoli, Doshi and Sert (2025) help us understand how this principle works specifically in the options market. They show that the main driver of bid ask spreads is the volatility of the intraday order flow, and that this effect is strongest precisely for 0DTE options. The reason is that option market makers manage their inventory risk mainly by matching buy and sell orders against each other, rather than by hedging every single position on the underlying. Therefore, when orders arrive on both sides of the book, the market maker bears less risk, can quote tighter spreads and attracts even more traders. The data seem to confirm this picture: according to Adams et al. (2026), By the end of the trading day the net imbalance of customers in at the money 0DTEs remains below 5,000 contracts, against an average volume close to one million. Furthermore, Amaya et al. (2025) observe that in 0DTEs a much larger share of trades takes place directly between customers, without the market maker in the middle. In other words, the more balanced the flow, the stronger the loop.

However, we should not forget that reflexivity works in both directions. During the market panic of August 2024, the share of 0DTEs in S&P 500 options volume fell from 50% to 26%, as investors moved towards longer dated hedges (OptionMetrics, 2024).

Why the Greeks behave wildly

Now that we know why these instruments are so heavily traded, we need to understand why they behave so differently from conventional options. The answer lies in the Greeks. The gamma of an at the money option is inversely proportional to σ√T, which means that as the time to expiry T approaches zero, gamma literally jumps. To give a concrete example (assuming the S&P 500 at 6,000 points and an implied volatility of 15%), the gamma of an at the money option ten minutes before the close is about 29 times higher than that of the same option with one month left. At the same time theta accelerates: at 3:50 pm the option is worth about $360 per contract, but if the index does not move it loses roughly $18 every minute.

The final consequence is that delta turns into a step, and the option becomes almost a binary bet on where the index will close. 

Lottery or opportunity?

We can now go back to the question in the title. If we look at retail investors, the lottery hypothesis seems confirmed. Beckmeyer, Branger and Gayda (2023) estimate that retail traders lose on average about $358,000 per day on S&P 500 0DTEs, and that more than $50 million of their losses are due to transaction costs alone. Although retail represents only approximately 6% of 0DTE volume, about 75% of retail trades in S&P 500 options are in fact on 0DTEs. Behavioural finance and cognitive psychology offer a convincing explanation: as shown by Barberis and Huang (2008), investors tend to overweight small probabilities and are therefore willing to overpay for assets offering a small chance of a very large gain, exactly like an out of the money 0DTE option. Interestingly, Beckmeyer et al. note that the losses come mostly from buying, while retail traders perform much better when they sell.

Institutions, which account for around 94% of 0DTE volume (Almeida, Freire and Hizmeri, 2025), tell a very different story. For them 0DTEs are a precise tool: wealth managers sell them systematically to generate yield, market makers and volatility funds use them to hedge their gamma and theta exposure, andthematic macro-funds buy them to protect themselves against a single event, such as a CPI release or a FOMC meeting, without paying weeks of premium (Ambrus Capital, 2023). Thus they are often defined by professionals as pure insurance, becauseinstitutions can hedge against specific and unexpected risks with a precise time frame at low premium thanks to 0DTE rapid decaying theta.

Moreover, sellers of 0DTE options collect a high variance risk premium. Still, this is not free money. Almeida et al. find that the mispricing of 0DTEs was very profitable before 2022 but faded once options became available every day, while Vilkov (2026) shows that unconditional strategies earn little after costs and tail risk, and only conditional rules tested out of sample reach Sharpe ratios between 1.0 and 1.3.

Hence the answer to our original question in the title is inherently nuanced: like any derivative contract, 0DTEs can be valuable instruments for risk management optimization and at the sametime be treated as a lottery by investors without in-depth knowledge and experience, swayed by promises of easy gainsmade by their neighbour or a Redditor on Wall Street Bets.

References

• Adams, G., Dim, C., Eraker, B., Fontaine, J.S., Ornthanalai, C., Vilkov, G. (2026). Do S&P 500 Options Increase Market Volatility? Evidence from 0DTEs.
• Almeida, C., Freire, G., Hizmeri, R. (2025). 0DTE Asset Pricing.
• Amaya, D., Garcia Ares, P.A., Pearson, N.D., Vasquez, A. (2025). 0DTE Index Options and Market Volatility: How Large is Their Impact?
• Ambrus Capital (2023). Dispelling False Narratives About 0DTE Options.
• Barberis, N., Huang, M. (2008). Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability Weighting for Security Prices.American Economic Review.
• Beckmeyer, H., Branger, N., Gayda, L. (2023). Retail Traders Love 0DTE Options… But Should They?
• Brogaard, J., Han, J., Won, P. How Does Zero Day to Expiry Options Trading Affect the Volatility of Underlying Assets?
• Dim, C., Eraker, B., Vilkov, G. (2024). 0DTEs: Trading, Gamma Risk and Volatility Propagation.
• OptionMetrics (2024). Trading in Popular Zero Day Options Dried Up During Monday's Market Panic.
• Pagano, M. (1989). Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity.Quarterly Journal of Economics.
• Pederzoli, P., Doshi, H., Sert, S.A. (2025). Risky Intraday Order Flow and Option Liquidity.
• Vilkov, G. (2026). 0DTE Trading Rules.
Economie