Silence! The Bond Market is Speaking

The Trump Presidency and the Bond Market

The Trump presidency, which began in January 2025, has been flooding the zone with hundreds of incidents previously considered presidency-ending. It has worked well, because dangerous news is now hidden like a tree in a forest—visible to everyone, but detectable only on closer inspection. One of these trees is the bond market, and the economists inspecting it have started to draw more attention. September was the worst month for US government bonds in four years, as yields surged more than half a percentage point to 5.3%. In terms of bond market movements, this is gargantuan.

Bonds are boring. They don’t move much, and returns are predictable. Stocks represent a company’s present and expected future value. A bankruptcy can consequently send them to zero, while good news can send them to the moon. Bonds have a fixed interest rate—called a coupon—and duration, at the end of which the loaned money is repaid. In the event of bankruptcy, bondholders sometimes recover a portion of their money.

There is therefore less—yet still considerable—risk in bonds compared to stocks, especially those issued by corporations or developing countries. Investors looking for safety consequently prefer the government bonds of developed nations, which have economically powerful states backing their debt. Nowhere is this truer than in the US, where, in addition to being the world's largest economy, the global reserve currency is issued. Anyone conducting international business uses dollars and needs a secure place to store them. Safe investments with modest but steady returns, like US Treasuries, are therefore in high demand: there is always a buyer or a seller. This depth and liquidity, fueled in part by persistent trade and budget deficits, has created a massive pool of capital for the US government to draw on.

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Bonds, Central Banks and Inflation

The interest on a bond is paid as a coupon, which is a fixed percentage of the face value paid out regularly. If interest rates surge from 5% to 6%, existing coupons remain fixed. Instead, bond prices on the secondary market decrease to make up for the missing 1%. For example, a $1,000 bond at 5% might drop in price to $833; upon maturity, it will pay out $1,000, and the $167 difference helps compensate for the lower coupon.

The higher the required yield, the more expensive borrowing becomes for the issuer. Rates need to be high enough for a lender to consider it a worthwhile investment. If lenders are confident in future repayments, they will accept a lower rate. The extra yield demanded for uncertainty is the risk premium—a margin paid to compensate the lender for taking on the risk of default. The yield must also cover other elements: lenders want to preserve their purchasing power, so rates must compensate for inflation. Finally, it must compensate investors for tying up their money over the duration of the bond rather than pursuing alternative opportunities. This is a simplification, but it helps explain why yields move. In contrast to earlier crises, investors have not flocked to US government bonds as a safe haven. Something has changed.

AI has captured financial markets with massive capital deployment. Substantial amounts of debt and equity have been raised, pulling liquidity from other asset classes. To draw that money back into government debt and hold it there long term, borrowers must offer an additional premium. Important as this is, it remains secondary—inflation expectations and sovereign risk are the real drivers of these market movements.

To achieve its dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment, the US central bank (the Fed) relies primarily on the federal funds target rate. It serves as the baseline interest rate in the economy, upon which other borrowing costs and yield spreads are built. If this rate increases, borrowing costs rise across the board. The Fed does this to cool excess demand: higher rates incentivize saving, discourage borrowing, make loans like mortgages and auto loans more expensive, and curb credit-financed consumption. Economic activity slows. The inverse happens with a rate cut—cheaper credit stimulates investment and consumption. This is why central banks slashed rates during COVID.

Inflation is, in simple terms, an indicator of the balance between supply and demand. Prices rise when demand outstrips supply. This is why the Fed targets a modest 2% inflation rate: mild inflation signals healthy economic activity and incentives for businesses to expand. High inflation, however, indicates that supply cannot keep up with demand; to close that gap, rate hikes work to suppress demand and cool price growth. Given these mechanisms, what should the new Fed chair, Kevin Warsh, do?

Rocks and Hard Places

Inflation has been above target since 2022, so the obvious answer would seem to be hiking rates. But that is easier said than done. Crucially, the latest inflation spike stems from energy prices rather than an overheating economy. It is not that energy demand surged dramatically—though some growth occurred—but rather that supply contracted due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the war with Iran. It mirrors Europe being cut off from Russian gas in 2022: demand remained steady while supply plummeted, producing the exact same price surge. To curb this supply-driven inflation, the Fed would have to suppress demand even further.

At the same time, the broader US economy is showing clear signs of strain. Unemployment is rising and job growth has essentially flat-lined. Struggling businesses could benefit from lower interest rates to finance capital expenditures and preserve payrolls. Donald Trump also favors lower rates to support equity markets and sustain the credit-fueled AI boom, which remains one of the few genuine growth engines. Caught between sticky inflation and weakening labor markets, the Fed faces a dilemma: hiking further risks deepening economic distress, while failing to act risks letting inflation expectations run wild, which would push bond yields higher regardless. In either scenario, yields face upward pressure.

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Lastly, there is the risk premium. US sovereign debt has begun to lose its aura of being entirely risk-free. Under Bill Clinton, the federal budget ran surpluses, and the US was projected to gradually retire its public debt. Since then, successive Republican administrations significantly expanded the debt through broad tax cuts and elevated defense spending. Democratic administrations likewise expanded deficits—largely to fund emergency responses to major crises like the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and COVID-19, followed by targeted public investment bills under Joe Biden intended to support long-term tax revenues. Trump bears responsibility for a substantial share of the national debt, and unlike emergency interventions, critics argue these deficits produced little lasting structural improvements to show for it.

Recent Developments

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, one of Trump's loyal appointees, recently stated that he believes bond yields are too high. He pointed specifically to 10-year Treasuries, as their yields directly influence key economic borrowing costs like mortgage rates. To rein them in, he promised intervention. The Treasury bought back long-term bonds, reducing their market supply to put downward pressure on long-term yields. Because the federal government runs an ongoing deficit, it financed these repurchases by issuing short-term debt.

This maneuver introduces considerable uncertainty into the government's future borrowing costs. Issuing 10-year bonds locks in interest expenses for a decade, providing fiscal predictability. In contrast, 2-year notes must be refinanced in two years at whatever the prevailing market rate happens to be. With rates on an upward trajectory, yields are unlikely to be cheaper when that debt matures. If rates stay elevated or rise further, the Treasury's refinancing burden will become substantially heavier.

There is a telling historical parallel here: the 1992 crisis when George Soros broke the Bank of England on Black Wednesday. When the British central bank tried to defend an artificially high peg for the pound within the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, markets concluded the rate was unsustainable. As the Bank of England intervened, Soros and his chief strategist, Stanley Druckenmiller, placed a massive bet against the currency and forced the central bank's hand. The Bank of England capitulated, letting sterling crash out of the mechanism. The political humiliation damaged the Conservative government's economic credibility so severely that it cleared the path for Tony Blair's landslide Labour victory in 1997.

Working alongside Druckenmiller during that episode was a young trader who saw firsthand what happens when policymakers fight market realities: Scott Bessent. Decades later, Druckenmiller noted in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that the bond market is functioning exactly as it should. Instead of attempting to artificially suppress yields, Druckenmiller argued, Bessent and the Treasury must confront the real root cause—the runaway US primary deficit.

We listen

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To read the bond market, one can look at two-year and ten-year Treasury yields. The 2-year yield essentially reflects what the market expects the Federal Reserve to do in the near term: a sharp rise signals expected rate hikes, while a drop points to rate cuts. The 10-year yield, by contrast, captures longer-term expectations: where inflation will settle, how resilient economic growth will be, and whether federal finances remain sustainable. Below are the yields for both maturities. Notice the sharp spike in both: the 2-year yield has rebounded to levels seen shortly after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while the 10-year yield is significantly higher. In some respects, markets have revisited 2023 levels after just three years, but with a visibly more troubled long-term outlook.

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The ghost of 1970s energy-shock inflation still haunts investors, leaving scars from when OPEC embargoed oil deliveries over US support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Today, shipping disruptions and Iranian blockades in the Strait of Hormuz present a modern parallel. The Fed cannot reopen shipping lanes or repair damaged energy infrastructure, nor can it instantaneously expand oil output elsewhere. All monetary policy can do is crush aggregate demand to keep energy-driven prices from spiraling further—a move that risks punishing an already fragile domestic economy. The ultimate duration and geopolitical scale of the conflict will determine the severity of this supply shock; while the exact outcome remains uncertain, bond markets have already priced in a non-negligible risk premium.

The broader economic outlook remains equally fraught. Whether artificial intelligence unleashes an era of unprecedented productivity or precipitates costly market disruption remains an open question: a deflating tech bubble and widespread labor dislocations would both pose headwinds to growth. There are, however, silver linings. Global industry is considerably less oil-intensive today than in the 1970s, and genuine efficiency gains from AI adoption could eventually offset structural cost pressures. For now, however, those potential silver linings risk being obscured by the headlights of an oncoming economic train.

Everything discussed here pulls in opposing directions. The Fed faces compelling reasons to both hike and cut rates. Donald Trump hopes inflation will erode the real value of the national debt, while Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent wagers on falling borrowing costs. We might see a rapid return to normalcy, or another speculative bubble could burst. Two active wars continue, each involving non-US nuclear powers. Through it all, the bond market transmits a singular signal: turbulent times lie ahead. In absolute terms, yields across the curve sit at heights not seen since the Great Financial Crisis. No matter how you slice it, there is no straightforward way out of this bind.

As the adage goes: when America sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold. Issuing debt denominated in one’s own currency is an exorbitant privilege. Much of the developing world must borrow in US dollars; if global investors can secure safe, high returns on US Treasuries, they require a significantly higher risk premium to deploy capital to emerging markets. Coupons on developing-nation debt must climb higher, tightening external financial conditions worldwide.

Don’t Kill The messenger

Forecasting is a messy science. Forecasts also tend to degrade in times of crisis, when the need for accuracy is arguably the greatest. The hive mind that is the bond market is sending a signal that it, too, thinks things have to change. The point—as Druckenmiller noted in a recent Wall Street Journal column—is that one cannot simply deny the bond market and its signals. Shooting the messenger will not make them go away.

Will there be a debt crisis? Robin Wigglesworth, author of A Fabulous Debt, suggests that if one occurs, it will be a slow, steady march toward crisis rather than a sudden, catastrophic default. What is arguably most damaging is persistently high yields. Compounded by other ongoing economic disruptions, these elevated borrowing costs will severely handicap any future administration attempting to clean up the fiscal mess. The noose is tightening significantly—and while it has not snapped shut just yet, the room to maneuver is vanishing fast.

Jonas Bruno

Sources & Further Reading

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