The war ends. Who gets their company back?
Western companies left Russia with contracts preserving a route home. Years later, the people who replaced them have reasons to keep the door shut.
In 2022, Renault sold its controlling stake in Russia’s biggest carmaker for a reported one rouble. In February 2025, AvtoVAZ chief executive Maxim Sokolov put a figure on a possible return: at least $1.3bn to cover investments made since Renault’s departure.
Renault had kept an option to repurchase its stake at certain times over six years. Sokolov’s demand was not an agreed price. But it raised a question that matters well beyond one French carmaker: who pays for what happens to a business while its former owner is away?
Companies that left Russia sometimes kept the right to buy their businesses back. Since then, deadlines have passed, competitors have expanded and factories have changed. An end to the fighting would not turn back the clock.
Keeping a way back Renault transferred its 67.69% AvtoVAZ stake to NAMI, a Russian state institute. Its separate Renault Russia business went to a Moscow city entity. The repurchase option covered only the AvtoVAZ stake.
For Renault, the option preserved a choice: leave now and consider returning if conditions improved. It could buy back the stake under the agreed terms or walk away. That flexibility had potential value for shareholders, alongside whatever cash the sale brought in.
NAMI, meanwhile, acquired a business that still needed components, technology and investment. Cheap ownership could come with expensive responsibilities.
A one-rouble price therefore tells an investor little on its own. Who takes on the debts? Who funds the factories? And what can the seller later reclaim? The answers matter as much as the headline price.
Who pays for the kitchen?
Imagine selling your flat in a hurry, with the right to buy it back within six years. The buyer renovates the kitchen. When you return, he asks you to pay for it. You never asked for the kitchen; he points out that you would get the benefit.
Now replace the kitchen with factory equipment, production lines and years of investment.
This was the argument behind Sokolov’s demand. AvtoVAZ had invested since Renault left, he said, and would need to be reimbursed. Reuters noted that he had not clarified whether the $1.3bn represented all investment or Renault’s hypothetical share. Renault’s public announcement did not disclose the full repurchase pricing formula either. There is no basis for assuming it could return for one rouble.
The commercial problem is clear.
Should Renault pay for every investment, including mistakes? Should AvtoVAZ be reimbursed for spending that has already generated profits? What if Renault would have modernised the factories differently?
Money spent is not the same as value created. A profitable production line may justify a higher price; an expensive mistake may add little worth buying.
The agreement also needs to give the new owner a reason to invest. If Renault could reclaim all improvements cheaply, why fund them? Yet making Renault reimburse every expense could leave it paying for decisions it never controlled.
Investment provisions and pricing formulas can help. Their real test comes during the years when someone else runs the business.
An option can expire before a war
Sometimes the route back disappears for a simpler reason: time runs out.
In November 2025, Sollers told Reuters that Mazda had allowed its three-year repurchase option to expire. Mazda did not respond to Reuters’ request for comment. Hyundai later confirmed that it had not exercised its option on its former Russian factory before its January 2026 expiry.
Both options bought time, but the contractual deadlines arrived before the geopolitical situation had been resolved.
Even an unexpired contract may not be usable. US Treasury guidance says prohibited new investment can include capital committed by exercising rights under older agreements. Depending on the investor and transaction, sanctions relief or specific authorisation may be required.
Russian rules have changed too. According to Morgan Lewis, legislation adopted in August 2026 allows courts, under specified conditions, to terminate certain repurchase rights held by investors from states designated “unfriendly”. That does not establish that Renault’s option has been cancelled. It shows how much the rules surrounding a contract can change after it is signed.
A ceasefire would not automatically lift sanctions, secure Russian approvals or revive an expired option. Each obstacle would need a separate solution. By then, the current owner might see little reason to offer the old terms.
The factory has moved on even with permission and an acceptable price, Renault’s board would still have to ask: is AvtoVAZ worth buying today?
Russia’s car market has changed. In April 2025, Reuters reported, citing market sources, that Chinese companies held more than half of it, up from less than a tenth before 2022. A returning manufacturer would face rivals that had spent its absence winning customers and building distribution networks.
The factories themselves may have changed purpose. Sollers said the former Mazda joint-venture plant in Vladivostok restarted in 2023 and was producing buses by November 2025. The industrial site remained, but its products and operating needs had evolved.
A returning investor would need to reassess suppliers, machinery, staff, customers and the spending required to compete. Its old market share would not be waiting alongside the equipment.
The financial test looks forward: do expected cash flows justify the repurchase price, further investment and continuing risk? Earlier losses are sunk costs. Buying back the business cannot undo them.
Renault could therefore hold a usable option and still decide its capital would earn better returns elsewhere. Meanwhile, the businesses that filled the gap have reasons to resist its return. Reuters reported in 2025 that local companies were lobbying against the return of departed foreign competitors. Better diplomatic relations would not remove those commercial interests. Peace does not reverse a sale.
So who gets the company back when the war ends?
The starting point is simple: a sold business stays with its buyer. Its former owner needs a surviving, enforceable repurchase right, must meet its terms before the deadline, and must secure the necessary sanctions permissions and regulatory approvals. Alternatively, it needs a new acquisition agreement or a specific restitution arrangement.
It must also want to return. Renault would have to assess AvtoVAZ against every other use for its capital.
For dealmakers, the lesson is that an exit clause can carry real financial value. A low sale price with a usable option is very different from the same price with a right that expires before conditions improve. The clause deserves as much scrutiny as the cheque.
Sokolov’s proposed bill, Mazda’s expired option and the buses leaving Vladivostok point to the same reality: businesses keep changing while their former shareholders wait.
The former owner may have kept a route back. Someone else now owns the destination.
Sources: This article draws on sources published between May 2022 and August 2026: Renault Group’s announcement of 16 May 2022; Reuters reporting from February and April 2025, November 2025 and February 2026; US Treasury / OFAC FAQ 1049 (June 2022); and Morgan Lewis’s August 2026 analysis of Russian legislation on certain repurchase rights.
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