German Election Roundup: The more things change, the more things stay the same

Germany wasn’t supposed to have an election this early. But after months of coalition deadlock and infighting, Chancellor Olaf Scholz pulled the plug, firing Finance Minister Lindner and triggering snap elections. The subsequent campaign exposed widespread discontent with the traffic light coalition of the SPD (Social Democrats), the Greens, and the FDP (Liberals), as shown below. Yet in an ironic twist of fate, this dissatisfaction led to an outcome where the only possible way forward is more of the same.

Figure 1: Satisfaction with the traffic light coalition, unsatisfied on the left, satisfied on the right.

Voter discontent often translates into gains for opposition parties. Accordingly, pre-election polls predicted strong performances by the right-wing Union (CDU & CSU) and the far-right AfD, at the expense of the traffic light coalition. This prediction has largely come true, with one surprise: Die Linke, who committed to opposition from the left.

First, a few words about the German electoral system. Everyone casts two votes: one for a candidate in their district (the first vote) and one for a party (the second vote). The second vote ultimately determines proportional representation, but there’s a hurdle: if a party receives less than 5% of the vote, it doesn’t enter parliament at all. First, the 299 district winners get a seat in the Bundestag, and then the remaining seats are allocated to ensure proportionality based on the second vote. Confusing? Don’t worry, it gets worse. Now, let’s take a look at the results (Figure 2 below) and break them down by party.

A graph of different colored squares

AI-generated content may be incorrect.

Figure 2: Election Results, BSW (4.9%) and other smaller parties not included

Braunes Gedankengut

While the AfD has gained significant traction recently, unsurprisingly increasing their vote share, they seem no closer to power than they were four years ago. As a far-right, Nazi-adjacent party, they remain politically untouchable. As a result, although they are now the second largest party, dethroning Scholz’s SPD, they are still far from governing at the national level, as shown below (Figure 3).

Their support comes from those most vulnerable to hardship, notably the impoverished East, where they received over 40 percent of the vote in certain districts. However, reducing the AfD to an eastern phenomenon would be mistaken. The AfD is the second strongest party in most of southern Germany. Their advantage stems from their ability to shape public discourse through savvy media and communication strategies.

They are now the loudest voice in the opposition and, together with Die Linke, hold what is called a “Sperrminorität”, meaning the two parties can block any changes to the German constitution. Currently, no other party is willing to form a coalition with them, but they have enough parliamentary seats to be a constant obstacle to any government. For now, Germany’s democratic institutions appear strong enough to contain their anti-democratic tendencies.

Figure 3: What do you think about a participation by the AfD in the next government? Not good on the left good on the right.

Feldschlacht

The FDP is a libertarian “pull yourself up by the bootstraps” party, often mocked as the “Porsche party” due to its wealthy, entrepreneurial voter base. With their modern platform on social issues and government efficiency, they captured young voters in 2021, giving them substantial leverage during coalition negotiations. This advantage was squandered through a series of poor political decisions, as evidenced by their subsequent failure to pass the 5 percent threshold—first in most regional, and eventually in the national elections.

The main culprit is party leader Christian Lindner, whose dogmatic obsession with maintaining a balanced budget during his tenure as Finance Minister hindered the coalition’s ability to adapt to a world increasingly shaped by industrial policy and state investment. The FDP essentially acted as an opposition party from within the government, which alienated both supporters of the coalition and its critics. Government opponents resented them for participating in the coalition, while coalition supporters disapproved of their obstructionism. Those left most dissatisfied were precisely the young voters they had won over four years ago.

Yet somehow, the final nail in the FDP’s political coffin came from an entirely different direction. Just days before Lindner’s dismissal, a top-secret FDP strategy memo, later dubbed the “D-Day Paper”, was leaked to the press. The document outlined a plan to deliberately sabotage the very coalition they were part of, portraying themselves as heroic defenders of the free market against the planned economy objectives of the Greens and the SPD. At the core of the strategy was the now-infamous pyramid diagram. The final step? “Open Battle!”

Figure 4: Pyramid from the FDP D-Day paper. From the top: Impulse, Set narrative qualitatively, Spread narrative quantitatively, Begin of open battle

Their plan, like the plans of many would-be heroic generals before them, failed because they expected their “enemy” to remain passive. Slumbering Chancellor Olaf Scholz finally woke up and caused the FDP’s plot to collapse simply by firing Lindner. The resulting media circus instead branded the FDP as an opportunistic traitor responsible for the downfall of the coalition.

The fact that the FDP actually delivered on their promises to their core voters has been overshadowed by the scandal, especially as those core voters have become an endangered species amid a shifting economic consensus. In addition, the party alienated the young voters it had recently gained, who have since turned to other parties offering different solutions to the same issues. With longtime party head and popular figure Christian Lindner stepping down, and after suffering defeats at both local and national levels, the FDP will need to undergo serious soul-searching.

Schadenfreude

The FDP were not the only major party to fail the test of the election. Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), a splinter group from Die Linke founded around the popular politician Sahra Wagenknecht in 2024, also faced a disappointing outcome—though for different reasons.

BSW defines itself as a “non-woke” left-wing party that claims to represent the average German. It expresses this identity through a hard stance on immigration, conspiracy-leaning rhetoric, and pro-Russian sympathies. In short, the party’s platform reflects a kind of political identity crisis. After early momentum and some notable victories in eastern Germany, the honeymoon seems to be over: they fell just short of the 5 percent threshold by only a few thousand votes.

Umfrage, Bundestagswahl 2025, Ansichten über das BSW | „Ich hatte mir von der neuen Partei BSW mehr neue Ideen erwartet.“ 49,0 | „Finde es gut, dass es mit dem BSW eine Partei gibt, die ein gutesVerhältnis zu Russland erreichen will.“ 28,0 | Infratest-dimap. 23.02.2025, 16:05 Uhr

Figure 5: Views about BSW: 49% I expected more new ideas. 28% I’m glad they want to achieve a good relationship with Russia.

In the end, their doom, similar to the FDP, comes from the fact that they only appeal to a very small group of voters. If you are right wing, you vote AfD. If you are left wing, you vote for Die Linke. They don’t bring anything new to the table, selectively plucking issues to play opposition, ultimately turning them into an incoherent mess that pleases no one. Their path to long term political relevance now lies in delivering on their promises in the regional parliaments.

Tot Geglaubte Leben Länger

Die Linke, the left-wing boundary on the established political spectrum, has been pronounced dead multiple times. Them receiving close to 9% when polls had them below 5% months before the election makes their success the biggest surprise of Election Day. Even more so as the party had recently been rocked by the split with Sahra Wagenknecht, one of their most popular figures, as she went off to form her own, previously described BSW in 2024.

However, if there is one thing Die Linke knows, it’s fighting for dear (political) life. They only won 4.9% in 2021 but entered the Bundestag anyway because they won three districts (remember the first votes), entitling them to complete representation. Faced with bad polls, they aimed to repeat this strategy but this time it didn’t matter. They greatly surpassed 5% and won a total of six districts.

Key factor of this revival was the dominant issue in the media: immigration. All parties, even Greens and SPD, were trying to cater to voters by promising that they were going to be strong on immigration. Friedrich Merz and the Union even tried to pass stricter immigration laws with the AfD votes. This violated a post war consensus that forbade democratic parties to work with the far right. Die Linke was the only party to vocally oppose this. Considering Germany’s history, many who were uncomfortable with this development flocked to them.

Figure 6: What subject was the most important for you vote? From top to bottom: Domestic security, Social security, Immigration, Economic Growth, Environment and Climate, Keeping peace, Rising prices.

Simultaneously, they did a lot of grassroots canvassing to learn what else worried Germans. What they found was that the cost of living, such as rent prices, was a big concern. Social security was tied with interior security, above immigration, as the top issue, as seen in Figure 6. A result that showed a clear disconnect with the voter concerns portrayed in the media.

Among 18-24-year-olds, one of their notoriously elusive demographics, they won 25% of the total votes. More than one in three young women voted Die Linke, and they topped the polls among Muslim voters as well. They appealed to those disillusioned by the status quo and yet opposed to flirting with reactionary politics.

In hindsight, the BSW split was a blessing in disguise. The party shed their political baggage (mainly in the form of Russia sympathizers and conspiracy theorists), allowing them to find what German politics lacked: a renewed, unapologetic left-wing voice.

Whether they can carry on with this momentum remains to be seen. Especially important will be party cohesion, as Die Linke has never been a stranger to infighting. After all, the worst enemy of a leftist is a slightly different leftist.

Figure 7: Voting shares by party, 18-24 year olds. Women on the left, men on the right

«Wer hat uns verraten? Sozialdemokraten!»

It’s emblematic that this slogan, though over 100 years old, is still the perfect summary of the SPD’s past actions. Karl Liebknecht, a communist, accused the Social Democrats of being traitors after the First World War and predicted that they, when push comes to shove, would always cave to totalitarian and conservative forces rather than defend workers.

Though he was proven right soon after, he never got to gloat. Liebknecht was murdered during the November Revolution, with the full knowledge, approval, and likely even on orders from the SPD. Once again, they sided with the right. His murderers walked free after a sham trial.

Back in the present, the SPD has, time and time again, been pulled to the right without putting up a fight. In the 2000s, under Schröder and later under Merkel, they oversaw large austerity programs.

Other parties, for better or worse, have all had their respective wins in line with their core values. The conservatives had fiscal responsibility, the Greens achieved the nuclear phase-out, and the AfD put immigration at the center of the debate. But what has the SPD achieved that would allow voters to recognize their success?

Their website listing 2023’s accomplishments presents the reform of the Hartz IV social insurance as a major success. This is celebrated as a win, and yet it was the SPD under Schröder that created Hartz IV in the first place. In general, this betrayal of core social values under the Schröder government drove many left-wing members to defect and join Die Linke upon its formation in 2007.

In the end, infighting within the centrist coalition paved an easy path for the Union, leaving the SPD in third place behind the AfD. And still, the electoral gods had one more punishment in store: a coalition with the CDU is now the only viable option.

Schuldenbremse

The Union coasted to victory more by default than by distinction. They opportunistically attacked the government, entered the immigration debate and used the increasing geopolitical tensions to present themselves as the strong man. But they were still the same run of the mill European right-wing party, right up to the point where they collaborated with the AfD on the immigration issue.

Soon after, the election results meant that they faced a new issue: Die Linke and AfD holding a Sperrminorität. The AfD is opposed to any debt break reform on principle, Die Linke is opposed if it concerns military spending but wants to reform or even abolish the debt break. But the new way Merz wants to go is rearmament through debt. So he made a second big move for a partial debt break reform with the old 2021 parliament, as in the new one he’d have to gain support from AfD or Die Linke for such a reform. The Greens managed to extract some concessions for their vote, but they weren’t nearly enough.

Sitzverteilung, 630 Sitze: SPD 120; Union 208; Grüne 85; AfD 152; Linke 64; SSW 1; Quelle: Bundeswahlleiterin

Figure 8: Seat distribution in the new Bundestag after BSW and FDP are out. SSW is a Danish minority party not affected by the 5% hurdle.

Was wäre wenn?

The Greens are the incumbent party that lost the least votes. Partially this may be due to an engaged and content electorate, but it also reflects their political impact in the traffic light coalition.

They had a vision of change for Germany, with Vice Chancellor and Economy Minister Robert Habeck being the prime advocate. It’s one of state investment and industrial policy for a stronger, more modern and greener Germany on the one hand, but also a realist and pragmatic policy in the face of crisis, such as with the energy crisis and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

It certainly is a flawed vision. They made many mistakes, acted too slowly and miscalculated how their policies would impact Germany. But still, it provides a departure from Germany’s economic model that has run its course and offers change.

On top of that came vicious and constant attacks from the right, spearheaded by CSU head Markus Söder. This channelling of hatred closely resembles how the AfD has been attacking the Greens for years. It’s probably a misguided way to “play pick me” for potential AfD voters. Playing with and normalizing reactionary politics, however, creates real world consequences. One of those is that this hatred led to attacks on politicians. Almost half of crimes against politicians in Germany in 2024 were committed against Greens.

Under these circumstances, the Greens can be content with their results. And if the new government struggles to make change, they might get a second shot at their vision, this time without a finance minister that blocks them at every turn.

Zurück in die Zukunft

Having gone through all major parties, regardless of their presence in the Bundestag, what were the coalition options and what is the result? Well, in part due to the FDP and BSW falling out of the Bundestag, there is only one likely option: SPD and the Union. Other combinations that reach 50 percent of seats range from impossible to highly unlikely.
This is not what Germany needs or wants, as made evident by figure 8. It’s a continuation of the same economic model established under Schröder and Merkel that has already run its course, rather than the fresh start it desperately needs.

Umfrage, Bundestagswahl 2025, „Eine Koalition aus Union und SPD wäre...“ | Alle [nicht gut] 41,0 ([gut] 48,0) | SPD-Wählende [nicht gut] 13,0 ([gut] 77,0) | Unions-Wählende [nicht gut] 18,0 ([gut] 72,0) | Infratest-dimap. 24.02.2025, 02:36 Uhr

Figure 9: A coalition between Union and SPD would be not good (left) good (right). First line is all voters below SPD and Union voters.

Let’s just look at one small but representative example from the coalition agreement. Financially disadvantaged children currently get 15 Euros a month for cultural activities. Now they will get 20 Euros. This substantial adjustment will allow them to get half a movie ticket each month. Life-altering, right? There are some positive things like rent support for mothers, but it simply isn’t enough.

Geister die wir riefen

For workers, this coalition agreement projects two things. With even harder sanctions, they will force people to accept bad working conditions and drive them to work more if they don’t earn enough, even as pensioners, eternally under threat of losing benefits. The difference between incentives to work and forced labour is a spectrum, after all.

This is a continuation of the economic model established under Schröder and continued under Merkel, where austerity and tax cuts lead to lower wages for workers and lower production costs for firms. This allows for a competitive edge in world markets.

However, this model has run its course. German firms aren’t struggling because they don’t produce cheaply enough, they are struggling because no one buys their goods anymore. World trade is in upheaval and exports are shrinking. Large countries can usually count on their large population to buy their own goods, but Germany’s middle class and workers have been so hollowed out by austerity and wage suppression that their consumption is weak. And nothing this government does will change this fact.

Was jetzt?

In the polls, the AfD is now on even ground with the Union. Its voters are primarily those who are most vulnerable to economic shocks. This new coalition, in these uncertain times, fails to introduce measures aimed at softening these blows. All this plays into the hands of the AfD, who could very well become the strongest party in 2029. One can only hope that they will plateau once they have captured all voters willing to accept right-wing extremists in exchange for voicing their discontent.

Other than that, the only hopeful message in that regard is that Die Linke has finally managed to divert some of the frustrated voters to its side. Centre parties may continue to lose ground while the parties on the fringes of the political spectrum continue to gain power. When it comes to collaboration, one might think the centre would prefer working with the fringes that hold democracy in high regard. But unfortunately, Merz has shown that, if deemed necessary, he will look to the right. History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.

Jonas Bruno